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A growing body of research in the usable privacy and security
community addresses the question of how to best influence user
behavior to reduce risk-taking.We propose to address this challenge
by integrating the concept of user experience (UX) into empirical
usable privacy and security studies that attempt to change risk-
taking behavior. UX enables us to study the complex interplay
between user-related, system-related and contextual factors and
provides insights into the experiential aspects underlying behavior
change, including negative experiences.
We first compare and contrast existing security-enhancing in-
terventions (e.g., nudges, warnings, fear appeals) through the lens
of friction. We then build on these insights to argue that it can be
desirable to design for moments of negative UX in security-critical
situations. For this purpose, we introduce the novel concept of
security-enhancing friction, friction that effectively reduces the
occurrence of risk-taking behavior and ensures that the overall UX
(after use) is not compromised.
We illustrate how security-enhancing friction provides an ac-
tionable way to systematically integrate the concept of UX into
empirical usable privacy and security studies for meeting both the
objectives of secure behavior and of overall acceptable experience.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy;
Social aspects of security and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Users are exposed to privacy and security risks on a daily basis,
and as technology becomes more pervasive, security risks linked
to technology use continue to increase [25]. Usable privacy and se-
curity (UPS) researchers have developed a wide variety of security-
enhancing interventions (e.g., nudges [1], warnings [2, 19], attrac-
tors [8, 9], fear appeals [50]) aiming to help users stay secure and
protected by avoiding risky behaviors. In this paper, we aim to
identify similarities and differences between these interventions,
as security-enhancing interventions are often studied separately,
making it difficult to compare their effects. Additionally, there is
no standardized way of measuring the effects of such security-
enhancing interventions. In particular, there is a lack of systematic
measurement of experiential factors, which could provide a nu-
anced understanding of why interventions correlate with certain
behavioral outcomes, and overall experience is not always assessed.
We argue that the field of user experience (UX) can help re-
spond to these challenges, as it holds rich insights into emotional,
subjective and temporal aspects that affect how a user perceives
their interactions with systems [52]. We believe that applying the
concept of friction to address security- and privacy-relevant risk-
taking behaviors is a promising direction and a highly relevant
way of bridging UX and UPS. We thus introduce the concept of
security-enhancing friction and describe actionable ways to transfer
the concept into practice using the large variety of UX methods
already available.
This article makes the following contributions:
• We compare and contrast existing security-enhancing inter-
ventions through the lens of friction design.
• We introduce the concept of security-enhancing friction
and explain how it can help reduce or prevent risk-taking
behaviors while keeping overall UX at an acceptable level,
thus further bridging the disciplines of UPS and UX.
• We suggest practical guidelines for the use of UX methods
to gain a better understanding of the underlying reasons for
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privacy- and security-relevant behaviors. In so doing, we
contribute to consolidating the objectives of “better security”




UPS researchers have designed a large variety of interventions to
help people avoid risk-taking behaviors. For the purpose of this
article, we term these attempts “security-enhancing interventions”,
interventions that intend to reduce, avoid, or correct risk-taking
behavior. In the following sections, we summarize important at-
tempts that have been made to encourage more secure behavior.
The cited studies are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
In selecting which publications to include, we conducted a search
of the ACM Digital Library and gave particular attention to studies
appearing in top-tier conferences and journals.
2.1 Nudges
Thaler and Sunstein [56] describe nudges as thoughtful “choice ar-
chitecture” that can be used to direct users in beneficial directions,
that is, to guide them to make decisions that are beneficial to them,
without restricting freedom of choice. Nudging acknowledges that
subtle differences in system design (e.g., defaults, saliency of fea-
tures, or feedback) can impact users’ behavior, leading to better or
worse outcomes for users [1]. In privacy and security, nudges can
guide users to make more privacy-conscious choices. For instance,
on social networks, users who attempt to post content publicly
can be nudged to reconsider their privacy settings [1]. Another
example stems from Twitter, where users are nudged to check their
application access settings right after changing their password.
This makes it more likely that users will take the suggested action.
Nudges can be considered an instance of “soft paternalism” that
supports decision-making without restricting the user’s choices.
Nudges have also been applied to direct users towards more secure
public wireless networks [57] and to encourage users to make more
privacy-conscious decisions on Facebook and mobile permissions
interfaces [61, 62, 64]. Peer et al. [45] studied the impact of person-
alizing nudges to match people’s decision-making styles, rather
than using “one-size-fits-all” nudges, and found that personalized
nudges can lead to stronger passwords.
Frik et al. [21] explored the use of commitment devices to nudge
users towards complying with security mitigations. A commitment
device is a mechanism that allows the “present self” to commit to
a future action, so that the “future self” is more likely to follow
through later. They find that giving people the opportunity to take
action at a later time may increase compliance with security mitiga-
tions. Renaud and Zimmermann [51] address the ethical questions
related to nudging, which is usually based on the premise that
nudging should be done for the good of the nudgee, rather than “for
profit” or other objectives that are not beneficial to the nudgee, as
criticized by the opponents of nudging. Of course, simply “avoiding”
nudges is not a realistic option, since there is no such thing as a
neutral choice architecture [1]. For instance, in the context of GDPR
consent notices, Utz et al. [59] describe how graphical interface
properties such as the position, type of choice and content fram-
ing influence people’s consent choices. Renaud and Zimmermann
[51] suggest a number of guidelines for ethical nudging based on
the principles of ethical research: respect for others, beneficence,
justice, scientific integrity and social responsibility.
2.2 Fear appeals
Fear appeals attempt to scare people into taking a particular rec-
ommended action to secure their information and devices [50].
The rationale is that emotions can help prompt action, with fear
being a powerful emotion. Fear appeals have been applied in var-
ious contexts, including phishing [30] and smartphone locking
behavior [3, 48]. Renaud and Dupois [50] point out, however, that
strong emotions can backfire, lead to adverse outcomes and be eth-
ically questionable. The authors also emphasize the wide variety
of measurements used to evaluate the effectiveness of fear appeals,
ranging from post-appeal attitudes, general attitudes, behavioral
intentions and attitudes, actual behavior and attitudes, attention
and behavioral outcomes. This lack of consensus on what needs
to be measured makes it difficult to compare the efficacy of fear
appeals across different studies, leading the Renaud and Dupois
to call for a recommended experiment design protocol that would
make it easier to compare studies.
In addition, it is unclear whether fear appeals actually succeed in
inducing fear, with many studies relying on a one-itemmeasure that
has been found insufficient to evaluate whether fear was induced
[7].
2.3 Warnings
Warnings usually aim to remind users about security risks, and are
displayed to users when there is a potential threat to information
security [63]. While some warnings merely alert users to the pres-
ence of a hazard, the most effective warnings generally provide
clear instructions about how to avoid it. Effective warnings must
capture users’ attention and convince them to take an action to
avoid or mitigate a hazard [12]. Warnings are frequently used in
UPS, for instance in the context of SSL/TLS warnings, where they
are intended to guide confused users to a safe path of action [19].
Another case in which warnings seem to produce security-
enhancing results comes from a study by Gorksi and colleagues
[23], who asked software developers to complete a short set of pro-
gramming tasks; they were either assigned to the control group (no
warnings) or to the test group, which worked with an API version
that integrated security warnings providing secure programming
tips. The developers who were exposed to the security warnings
created significantly more secure code than the developers in the
control group. A later participatory design study with software
developers found that design guidelines for end-user warnings are
only partially applicable to warnings for developers, who were
interested in details such as message classification, title message,
code location, link to detailed external resources and color [22].
While warnings have proven effective in many contexts, users
become habituated when they are exposed to a large number of
warnings. In a 2013 study on SSL, malware and phishing warn-
ings in Chrome and Firefox, Chrome users were significantly more
likely to ignore SSL warnings than Firefox users [2]. The authors
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hypothesize that this might be because Chrome did not have an
exception storing mechanism for certificate errors, which could
result in many false positives (warnings that are displayed in non-
risky situations) and produce habituation, which the authors called
“warning fatigue”. Both polymorphic warnings and attractors aim
to counteract warning fatigue, or habituation following repeated ex-
posure to warnings, and encourage users to pay increased attention
to warnings or other messages.
2.4 Polymorphic warnings
In order to force users to pay attention to warnings and prevent
habituation effects, polymorphic warnings intentionally delay and
continuously change the form of the required user inputs [10]. The
results demonstrated that users took fewer unjustified risks when
presented with polymorphic dialogues compared to traditional
warnings. “Audited” polymorphic dialogues, dialogues that warn
users that their answers will be forwarded to auditors, who can then
quarantine users who provide unjustified answers, performed even
better in terms of security, but were not perceived as acceptable.
Polymorphic dialogues seem to be more resistant to habituation
than static warnings [60], and multiple studies have measured their
effect in terms of brain response (functional magnetic resonance
imaging or fMRI) [5, 60].
2.5 Attractors
Attractors are user interface modifications that attempt to draw
users’ attention to the most important information for decision-
making. These attractors can either be purely visual, or temporarily
inhibit dangerous behaviors to redirect users’ attention to salient
information [9]. Attractors that require the user to interact with the
salient information (e.g., retype parts of information) were found
to be resistant to habituation [8]. Similarly, Karegar and colleagues
[32] investigated the effect of interaction modes and habituation
on user attention to privacy notices, concluding that that certain
types of interactions (e.g., drag and drop, checkboxes) performed
best at getting users’ attention.
3 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN EXISTING
SECURITY-ENHANCING INTERVENTIONS
The security-enhancing interventions described above vary in their
level of disruptiveness. To acknowledge these varying levels of
disruptiveness, we suggest that security-enhancing interventions
can be classified on a scale from high friction to low friction, simi-
larly to how Cranor [12] suggested that “communications that are
relevant for security tasks” could be classified on a scale from active
(interrupt user’s primary task) to passive (available to the user, but
easily ignored).
While some of the security-enhancing interventions above are
undoubtedly “high friction” and interrupt the user’s primary task
(warnings, polymorphic warnings), others can be located anywhere
on the scale and can take more or less disruptive forms (attractors,
fear appeals, nudges) as shown in Figure 1.
Table 1 compares and contrasts existing security-enhancing inter-
ventions using the following criteria: the objective the intervention
Figure 1: Scale of security communications from low fric-
tion (no interruption, easily ignored) to high friction (inter-
ruptive, cannot be ignored).
is intended to meet, the intended friction, and how and when the
effectiveness of the intervention is measured.
4 SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING
SECURITY-ENHANCING INTERVENTIONS
Table 1 compares the interventions’ similarities and differences,
making some shortcomings apparent:
• The interventions address different focus areas, and are usu-
ally studied separately. This makes it hard to compare effec-
tiveness across approaches.
• The sample studies evaluate success very differently, there
is no systematic measurement of experiential factors that
could provide a nuanced understanding of why interventions
correlate with the intended behavioral outcomes, or why
they fail.
• The time of measurement also differs substantially across
approaches, with most measuring success after exposure.
Habituation is not always measured.
• Finally, the interventions are often studied with a focus on
the behavioral outcome, that is, whether participants take
the intended action; the overall experience and acceptance
of the security-enhancing intervention are not always as-
sessed. However, security interventions can lead to negative
emotions (e.g., annoyance, circumvention, resignation, avoid-
ance) and could, in the worst-case scenario, lead users to stop
using the services that apply such interventions to improve
security. Such potential negative outcomes are not always
controlled for and mitigated.
In light of the aforementioned difficulties that many security
interventions face, we argue that the design of security interven-
tions should build on research from the fields of psychology and
user experience, which provide in-depth insights into users’ emo-
tions and psychological needs as well as the temporal aspects of
the user experience. Building upon these concepts to work towards
more secure user behaviors holds the potential to address existing
shortcomings. Therefore, in this paper, we integrate UX theory,
in particular research on friction and negative experience, with
security research to present a novel, interdisciplinary concept to
address the described challenges: security-enhancing friction.
First, it is essential to provide a short overview of UX theory.
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Intervention and Objective Intended friction Sample evaluation measures Time of measurementDuring After Long-
term
Nudges – Direct users to more
privacy- and security-conscious
choices
Behavioral intention [57, 64], behavioral data
[4, 61, 62], usefulness, willingness to use [62],
level of comfort [62, 64], creepiness, perceived
control of information disclosure, perceived rel-
evance of information requested, privacy con-
cern [64], understanding, reaction after multiple
nudges [4]
[4] [4, 57, 62,
64]
[61]
Fear appeals – Direct users
to more privacy- and security-
conscious choices using fear
Perceived vulnerability [30], perceived security
[30], fear [30, 48], response efficacy [3, 30, 48],
self-efficacy, response costs [3, 30, 48] S/P con-
cerns [3, 48], perceived severity [3, 48], behavior
[3, 48], perceived data value [3]
[3, 30, 48] [3, 48]
Warnings – Direct users to a
choice that prevents a specific
hazard
Behavioral data (adherence with warnings) [2,
16, 19, 23, 46] understanding of threat source,
data risk, and false positives [19], thoughts dur-
ing exposure to warning, comprehension, atti-






Polymorphic warnings – Di-
rect users to a choice that pre-
vents a specific hazard while
avoiding habituation effects
Behavioral data (adherence with warnings) [10];
time for completing tasks [10], brain response
[5, 60], mouse cursor tracking [5], eye tracking
[60]
[5, 10, 60] [5, 10] [60]
Attractors – Draw users’ atten-
tion to themost important infor-
mation
Behavioral data (adherence to recommended
action), survey questions on whether partici-
pants clicked and whether their decision was
informed [9]
[9] [9]
Table 1: A comparison of security-enhancing interventions according to their objective, intended friction (representing a
range), sample evaluation measures and time of measurement. Note that the intended friction can be lowered through ha-
bituation: The first time a user is exposed to a warning, friction may be high, but as they continue to be exposed, habituation
could make the friction appear lower.
5 USER EXPERIENCE, A GOOD CANDIDATE
TO PROVIDE A NUANCED
UNDERSTANDING OF SUBJECTIVE
EXPERIENCE
User experience (UX) focuses on emotional, subjective and tempo-
ral aspects that play a role when users interact with systems [52],
taking into account both hedonic (non-instrumental) and pragmatic
(instrumental) qualities of experience [40, 41]. Pragmatic qualities
are similar to the aspects measured by usability, which has tradi-
tionally focused on improving “the extent to which a product can
be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effective-
ness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use” (ISO
9241-11). Pragmatic qualities can also be described as “a product’s
perceived ability to support the achievement of do-goals” [37], such
as sending a text message to someone. Pragmatic qualities relate to
the functionality and utility of the product, while hedonic qualities
refers to a product’s perceived ability to support the achievement
of “be-goals”, such as “being competent” or “being special”. Has-
senzahl [27] argues that the fulfilment of be-goals is the driver of
experience, meaning that hedonic quality contributes directly to
the core of positive experience. The fulfilment of do-goals can often
be seen as a means to fulfilling be-goals. Standardized scales for
measuring UX include the Attrakdiff scale, which measures UX
along the dimensions of hedonic and pragmatic qualities [28] and
the UEQ, which evaluates UX along the dimensions of attractive-
ness, perspicuity, efficiency, dependability, stimulation, and novelty
[36].
Positive experiences are considered to result from fulfilling the
human needs for autonomy, competence, security, relatedness,
self-actualization/meaning, physical thriving, pleasure/stimulation,
money/luxury, self-esteem and popularity/influence [55]. UX is a
multi-faceted concept, and security-enhancing interventions can
impact different dimensions of UX to varying degrees. For instance,
we can hypothesize that an attractor (described in section 2.5) that
temporarily inhibits an action could create a moment of negative
UX, since the pragmatic quality (achievement of do-goals) of the
experience is momentarily compromised, but a carefully designed
attractor might not have a negative impact on the overall experi-
ence, given that the user’s psychological needs for security and
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competence are fulfilled thanks to the slower interaction. A mo-
mentary interruption in the user’s action does not necessarily have
a negative impact when the user reflects back on the experience.
Thus, when discussing UX, it is important to be conscious of the
fact that UX can refer to various time frames (Figure 2). Depending
on the context, researchers might be interested in momentary UX
(a specific change in feeling during an interaction), episodic UX
(perceptions related to a specific usage period) or cumulative UX
(views on a system after having used it for a while) [52].
Figure 2: The temporal dynamics of UX [52]
6 DESIGNING FOR NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE
AND FRICTION
UX theory and practice tend to focus on positive experiences, leav-
ing many open questions on how negative experiences are created
and the effects they may have. To apply UX theory in UPS, we need
to take a closer look at negative experiences. In this section, we
describe work on negative experiences and build on these examples
to illustrate what security-enhancing friction might look like.
Fokkinga and Desmet [20] suggest enriching UX by purpose-
fully involving negative emotions in user-product interaction. They
develop the rich experience framework, which combines a nega-
tive stimulus that triggers a negative emotion (e.g., anger, sadness,
frustration) with protective frames. Their approach involves three
steps, in which the designer decides (1) which negative emotion to
incorporate into the design, (2) how and when to elicit it and (3)
which protective frame to use. The protective frame is defined as
an element that takes away the unpleasant aspects of the negative
emotions to allow the user to enjoy their beneficial aspects. For
example, seeing a lion triggers fear in most people. Adding a protec-
tive frame (a cage) to the experience makes it a positive experience.
Without fear, the experience would not be enjoyable, as an empty
cage would be dull. The authors suggest that there are four types of
protective frames: the safety-zone frame (people perceive negative
a stimulus but feel protected from it), the detachment frame (people
observe an event without participating in it, e.g., watching a movie),
control frame (people are in the danger zone but trust they have the
skills to protect themselves from harm) and the perspective frame.
The perspective frame provides a window to the wider implications
of a situation. For instance, one participates in a charity run and
feels tired, yet the experience is positive since the pain contributes
to an important cause.
Cox and colleagues [11] also highlight that designing friction
into interactions by introducing “microboundaries” can have posi-
tive effects. The authors define microboundaries as interventions
that provide a small obstacle that prevents users from rushing from
one context to another by creating a brief moment of reflection.
They define design frictions as points of difficulty encountered
during users’ interaction with a technology and describe their po-
tential advantages, such as reducing the likelihood of errors in data
entry tasks or supporting health behavior change. They suggest
that introducing friction into experiences can disrupt automatic,
“mindless” interactions with positive effects, which seems relevant
for the security context. The authors compare microboundaries to
a smaller version of keeping a credit card encased in a block of ice:
you can still get the card out and make purchases, but the time
needed for the ice to melt away allows you to think about whether
you really want to spend the money.
Studies on design friction indicate that friction might be a power-
ful way to help people avoid undesirable behaviors, such as wasting
electricity [34] or procrastination [35], and instead adopt a “de-
sirable” behavior (help the user attain their goals, living a more
energy-efficient life). In order to help people engage in their desired
behaviors (e.g., working out or cleaning) instead of procrastinating,
Laschke et al. design an object that introduces friction when the
user procrastinates by dropping a puck representing the desired
task to the floor [35]. This friction intervention induced reflection
about procrastination and behavioral change. Another study [34]
designed friction to combat standby power consumption by creat-
ing a caterpillar-like object connected to a device’s power cord. It
“breathes slowly” during normal power consumption, but friction
is introduced as soon as the device is left in standby mode, wasting
energy. The caterpillar starts twisting awkwardly, creating a link
between the abstract concept of energy use and the consequences
for the environment. The authors suggest using feedback designed
to create situational friction as a way of disrupting routines and
suggesting alternative courses of action, while still being perceived
as acceptable and meaningful [34]. In some instances, friction can
intentionally slow down and interaction to reassure users. For ex-
ample, a time bar indicating the progress of sending an email can
reassure people that their email is being sent; it also provides room
for an undo in case of a quick change of mind or a “send” pressed
by mistake.
We define friction as follows:
Definition 6.1 (Friction). Friction is a momentary perturbation
in an otherwise uninterrupted interaction that a user has with a
system that does not compromise the user’s experience in the long
run or disrupt the user’s trust in the service.
In Section 7.1, we will reflect on how friction can be used to
discourage insecure behaviors in digital spaces, but for the time
being, let us consider examples of friction that are already used
to discourage unsafe behavior in the physical world, for example,
while driving.
6.1 Friction in the physical world
Figure 3 shows an example of friction in the physical world. Speed
bumps are commonly used to discourage drivers from going too
fast by introducing friction into the road that the driver cannot
avoid. In theory, the option to speed is still open to the driver,
but it is easier and more comfortable to adopt the safe behavior of
slowing down than to opt for the unsafe option. Another interesting
attribute of the pictured speed bump is that it allows bicycles to
pass by on the side without slowing down. We can see this as
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symbolic for different types of users, some of which need to be
exposed to friction to adopt better behaviors, while others do not. It
is also important that friction is used in contexts where it is useful
(e.g., speed bumps before pedestrian crossings) rather than in places
where it may seem superfluous. If the driver understands the reason
of the bumper, for example, close to a school, they may eventually
adopt that behavior automatically. In general, however, it is not
required that users understand the reason of a friction, or even
that they realize the presence of friction, for the friction to have an
effect on the users’ behavior. A modern ATM machine that delays
a user’s taking back the money only after they removed the card,
eventually will change how users act while withdrawing money,
having helped them to grow the habit to expect to see and take
back the card first and then the money, which is the reason why
the friction was introduced in the first place.
Of course, this example of friction in the real world has some
limitations that we can overcome in digital spaces. In this example,
the behavior we want to discourage is speeding, and the intended
behavior is driving more slowly. In the digital world, simply slow-
ing users down would not always be our sole objective. Instead,
we want to redirect their actions to a more secure path, making
insecure behaviors harder or less comfortable, and making the en-
couraged behavior easier to adopt and more comfortable in compar-
ison. While the option to engage in the insecure behavior remains
available, the secure behavior is relatively easier to choose.
Another example of friction in the physical world is rumble
strips on highways. When a driver starts to leave their lane, thus
attempting to engage in unsafe behavior, these strips introduce
physical friction. Instead of encouraging drivers to slow down, they
direct them back to the safe course of action and encourage them
to stay in their lane.
Friction is frequently used to improve safety in contexts beyond
driving. Firearms include safety mechanisms to prevent accidental
firing, child-proof medication bottles use a push-and-turn mecha-
nism to make access more difficult for children. In contexts where
security and safety are of highest importance, two persons with
separate sets of credentials can be required to perform a high-risk
action, from accessing data to launching missiles.
These examples of friction in the physical world demonstrate
how friction can encourage certain behaviors over others. Similar
approaches are used in the digital sphere. According to Defini-
tion 6.1, fear appeals [3, 30, 48], for instance, are attempts to design
for friction with short spikes of fear in order to make users behave
more securely. However, taking up the notion of friction from a
UX perspective, there are several more dimensions we can consider
with respect to a negative experience. These call for a better under-
standing of the interplay between momentary friction, subjective
user perceptions, emotions and, eventually, behavioral change for
better security. To incorporate these dimensions, we introduce a
new concept, which we call "security-enhancing friction".
7 INTRODUCING SECURITY-ENHANCING
FRICTION
Based on the theoretical foundations presented in Section 6, we
define security-enhancing friction as follows:
Figure 3: Friction in the physical world: speed bumps are
used to encourage vehicles to adopt the safer behavior: slow-
ing down. In digital spaces, friction can help encourage
a large variety of secure behaviors beyond slowing users
down. (Picture by the authors)
Definition 7.1 (Security-enhancing friction). Security-enhancing
friction is friction that is designed to mitigate the risk of a certain
attack by lowering the occurrence of risk-taking behavior with-
out affecting overall episodic UX. Security-enhancing friction can
encourage a defined, more secure behavior. Security-enhancing
friction may have a momentary negative effect on a user’s UX, but
overall UX remains within acceptable levels to avoid disuse.
Figure 4: The impact of security-enhancing friction on UX.
After the risky situation has passed, UX recovers to an ac-
ceptable level.
As described in this definition, and as shown in Figure 4, security-
enhancing friction causes a short spike in negative UX, which
then recovers to an acceptable level to avoid disuse. Definition 7.1
suggests that we can assess whether a perturbation qualifies as
friction by applying UX methods. In order to decide whether a
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friction is “security-enhancing”, however, we need to compare it
to a solution without friction or with another type of friction so
that we can observe its effect on the occurrence of a defined risky
behavior. By measuring the occurrence of secure/insecure behavior
and UX in combination, we can avoid security interventions that
lead to bad UX, and in the worst case, disuse.
What is the advantage of introducing the concept of security-
enhancing friction?
Security-enhancing friction, as a concept:
• Helps design interactions that encourage users to avoid risk-
taking behaviors while keeping overall UX at an acceptable
level, thus contributing to bridging UX theory and usable
privacy and security with a useful framework that system-
atically considers both security concerns and UX concerns.
Security-enhancing friction can help avoid interactions that
are perceived as “too annoying” or disruptive, and thus avoid
disuse of secure technologies.
• Provides a new perspective for understanding security-
enhancing interventions through the lens of friction.
• Encourages the use of methods from the fields of psychology
and UX to gain a better understanding of the psychological
reasons why people engage in certain behaviors. It attempts
to facilitate the transfer to practice by providing a set of
methods that can be combined to measure the effect of the
intervention on security-relevant behavior and on a given
user’s experience (both momentary and overall).
We can use the insights from negative experience design described
in the previous section to suggest examples of security-enhancing
friction.
7.1 Examples of security-enhancing friction
In the digital realm, there are various ways friction can be used to
improve security behaviors in design interventions. We will dis-
cuss three examples that can improve security behaviors while
also providing acceptable UX: password meters, anti-phishing in-
terventions, and SSL/TSL warnings. Note that these examples, and
the impact of the described friction design on UX, still need to be
backed up by empirical data (as described in Section 9). We use
them here to illustrate the concept of security-enhancing friction.
7.1.1 Password meters. Password meters indicate whether a user’s
password is strong or weak (for an example, see Figure 5). They can
employ a variety of interaction attributes, including the strategic
use of colors, a comparison to other people’s passwords [17], size
of the password meter, presence of suggestions for improvement,
or the presence of a visual indicator vs. text only [58]. Overall, they
have a positive impact on the security of chosen passwords [17, 58].
• Insecure behavior that should be avoided: Use of “insecure”
passwords.
• Intended behavior: Set password that is harder to crack.
• Interaction attributes used to induce friction: Colors, compar-
ison to others’ passwords, size of password meter, presence
of suggestions for improvement.
• UX is acceptable because: Users can easily evaluate the
progress they have made in coming up with a more secure
password.
Figure 5: Example of the password meters studied by Ur et
al. [58]. Appearance and scoring changed depending on the
condition.
Figure 6: To protect against phishing attempts, security-
enhancing friction can be used when a link is recognized
as suspicious (e.g., button text and link destination do not
match) in order to draw the user’s attention to the URL they
intend to visit.
7.1.2 Anti-phishing intervention. The second example builds on
ideas from Bravo-Lillo and colleagues [8, 9], who successfully tested
interventions similar to Figure 6 in the context of plugin installa-
tion dialogues. Turning to the context of phishing attempts, we
can imagine a system that recognizes suspicious elements in an
email, such as a button whose text (e.g., "Go to Amazon") does not
match the associated URL (e.g., “amaz0n.com”). By asking the user
to re-type the security-relevant information (the URL), security-
enhancing friction could help re-direct the user’s attention and
encourage the safer behavior. It is crucial, of course, that such warn-
ings do not appear every time users want to click on a link in an
email. Instead, such pop-ups should be a rare exception whenever
suspicious elements are discovered in an email.
• Insecure behavior that should be avoided: Clicking mind-
lessly on a link in an email that seems to be a phishing
attempt.
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• Intended behavior: Verify certain properties of the email (e.g.,
sender address, contextual cues, does the URL correspond to
what the button says).
• Interaction attributes used to induce friction: Color, contrast,
de-activated button, re-typing security-relevant information.
• UX is acceptable because: the threat is clear, the interruption
is short.
Figure 7: Felt et al. [19] designed a warning for SSL/TSL cer-
tificate errors and improved adherence to secure behavior
by promoting the secure choice and demoting the insecure
choice.
7.1.3 SSL/TSL warnings. Web browsers use SSL/TSL warnings to
inform users that the privacy of their connection could be at risk
[19]. Their objective is to allow informed decision-making, or at
least guide the user to safety. Felt et al. [19] tested different vari-
ants of warnings, and found that a modified button placement and
design was able to promote the safe choice and demote the unsafe
choice (see Figure 7). While not all certificate errors indicate an
insecure website, the authors were still able to increase the default
secure behavior and lead users back to the previous website. Note
that their warning design did not improve user understanding, but
nevertheless increased secure behavior.
• Insecure behavior that should be avoided: Visiting a website
without a valid SSL/TSL certificate.
• Intended behavior: Go back to the previous website.
• Interaction attributes used to induce friction: Color (red for
danger), placement (button hard to find). Users are often
forced to leave their navigation path, leading to strong fric-
tion.
• UX is acceptable because: Users can still go to the insecure
website if they really want to; disruption stays within ac-
ceptable bounds.
7.2 Example of a failed attempt at
security-enhancing friction
To demonstrate which types of security interventions may lead to
disuse of technology, imagine attempting to sign up for an online
newspaper subscription. To encourage new subscribers to choose
more secure passwords, the website reacts to each attempt to type
in an insecure password by changing the placement of the sign-up
button and decreasing its contrast, making it harder to see. Thus,
after each attempt to sign up with an insecure password, it becomes
harder to sign up, but the user does not get detailed feedback on
why the process is so difficult. The UX curve of such a sign-up
process would likely look similar to Figure 8, where UX drops
at the security-enhancing friction (button changes contrast and
placement), but does not recover after the intervention. We can
consider this a failed attempt to create security-enhancing friction,
since UX does not recover, and such a scenario would likely lead
users to switch to another website providing similar services.
• Insecure behavior that should be avoided: Use of “insecure”
passwords.
• Intended behavior: Set password that is harder to crack.
• Interaction attributes used to induce friction: Placement of
sign-up button, contrast.
• UX is not acceptable because: Friction is too high and user
does not get sufficient feedback explaining the difficulties.
Note that this is an imaginary use case intended to illustrate the
possibility of introducing friction that is too strong and leads to a
persistent drop in overall UX. To confirm whether this example is
really a failed attempt, the impact of the described design interven-
tions would need to be measured empirically (see Section 9). This
example also illustrates how business interests and security inter-
ests can impact each other. Secure passwords improve the user’s
resilience to attacks, but strong friction as described above will lead
to disuse and lack of sign-ups to the service. This exemplifies the
importance of empirical user research when implementing security
measures that impact a users’ experience with a product or service.
Figure 8: When UX does not recover to an acceptable level
after the risky situation has passed, friction can lead to dis-
use, and thus does not fulfill the requirements of security-
enhancing friction.
8 HOW TO INDUCE SECURITY-ENHANCING
FRICTION
The examples in the previous section demonstrate a wide variety
of ways design can be used to induce friction. Color, contrast, step-
wise advancement, placement of buttons, sound and more can be
used. We refer to these ways of how to induce friction as interaction
attributes, similar to the interaction attributes used in UX design
when defining interaction aesthetics [38].
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Table 2 shows examples of interaction attributes that can be used
by designers to induce security-enhancing friction.
Category Induces less friction Induces more friction
Speed fast slow
Steps one step several steps
Color muted flashy
Contrast high contrast low contrast





Placement directly visible needs scrolling









Table 2: Examples of interaction attributes that can be used
to induce security-enhancing friction. These attributes rep-
resent a continuum. The attributes can influence each other,
and combining multiple attributes can lead to higher fric-
tion.
Designers may worry that introducing security-enhancing fric-
tion could lead to disuse of their product or service. Disuse would
be the result of friction that creates overly negative UX (i.e., UX that
does not recover to acceptable levels). To avoid such negative user
experience, it is important to consider which interaction attributes
are appropriate for the users of a specific interaction. For instance,
when users of a website are typically pressed for time (e.g., when
attempting to buy a product that sells out quickly), introducing
friction that slows them down would not be a wise choice and UX
would likely not recover if they were not able to buy the product in
time. Instead, a designer of friction would need to align use of other
interaction attributes (Table 2) with the objectives and motivations
a user has for an interaction. For example, changing colour, con-
trast, typography, or even using physical vibration could be more
appropriate for users who are typically under time pressure. A rich
understanding of typical user objectives and motivations can be
achieved through user research.
Second, it is imperative that designers carefully measure the
impact of any friction they introduce with a representative sample
of users, through empirical measures of momentary, episodic and
long-term UX of an interaction that includes security-enhancing
friction. Note that any friction will impact certain qualities of UX
more strongly than others. For instance, slowing down an interac-
tion by asking a user to re-type an URL (as displayed in Figure 6)
could impact the pragmatic quality (achievement of “do-goals”) of
an experience, but at the same time could improve hedonic qual-
ity of the experience (achievement of “be-goals”, see Section 5) by
fulfilling the psychological need for security and control. When de-
ciding which UX dimensions to retain when designing for friction
and which ones to momentarily compromise, both the objectives
and motivations of the user, as well as security, need to be carefully
balanced.
In the next section, we describe how designers can obtain such
detailed and nuanced measures of UX in order to understand the
impact of friction, fine-tune friction design and avoid disuse.
9 HOW TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF
SECURITY-ENHANCING FRICTION
In this section, we suggest a framework for systematically mea-
suring the effects of security-enhancing friction in a nuanced way
based on UX theory. By “systematic measurement”, we mean nu-
anced measurements that can be applied across studies and take
the temporal aspect of UX into consideration.
In order to transfer the concept of security-enhancing friction
to practice, we suggest applying a range of experience evaluation
methods to security- and privacy-relevant contexts to systemat-
ically integrate both experience-based and behavioral measures.
Table 2 describes how researchers and designers can measure the
temporal dynamics of UX throughout a privacy/security-relevant
interaction in order to achieve the intended security-enhancing
friction experience at each step. In addition, security-enhancing
friction needs to lower the likelihood of a defined risk-taking be-
havior, thereby reducing the likelihood of a successful attack (while
keeping overall UX at an acceptable level). The combination of
empirical methods (Table 3) also enables researchers and designers
to understand the impact of various types and combinations of
security interventions have on their user experience and behavior.
The described methods are meant as suggestions for how to eval-
uate users’ experience with security-enhancing friction at various
time points, which should be combined deliberately and with care.
For instance, the think-aloud method is usually combined with an-
other method, such as user tests. User tests usually also include an
interview or questionnaires to obtain more complete observations
of how participants interact. This remark holds true for all phases
of the experience evaluation.
While, as described in Table 3, behavioral intention can be used
as an approximation of behavior when behavioral data is not read-
ily available, some measurement of behavior as a ground truth
would be advisable. Redmiles et al. [49], for instance, systematically
compare real-world data to self-reported results with a focus on
updating behavior. They show that self-reported data largely varies
consistently and systematically with measured data in the context
of software updates.
Note that creating understanding of security concepts is not the
primary goal of security-enhancing friction, just like physical speed
bumps or rumble strips do not attempt to help drivers understand
specific safety issues. Instead, the goal is to make the insecure action
less attractive through friction and make the secure course of action
relatively more attractive, all while keeping UX at an acceptable
level.
Table 3 includes knowledge-based measures of success, since
the goal may be to improve understanding of security concepts in
certain contexts. An example might be “private” browsing modes,
which are often perceived as more secure by users than warranted
[26]. In this context, improving understanding of the actual security











When assessing the effects of security-enhancing friction, participants will
likely be asked to interact with a prototype or finished product – for instance,
through a user test. In this context, the think-aloud method [39] can be
applied to assess momentary UX. This method consists of asking people to
think aloud while solving a problem or during an interaction. The think-aloud
method allows researchers to understand whether the security-enhancing fric-
tion created the intended short spike of negative UX and whether UX recovers
afterwards. If used in pre-tests, the think-aloud method should also be used to
verify that the spike of momentary UX is not too strong.
Psychophysiological measurements are another option to understand momen-
tary experience. Eye tracking [47] can give insights into privacy and security
perceptions, as used for instance by [43] to compare Facebook interfaces tai-
lored for privacy support by analyzing differences in gaze patterns and areas of
interest between the interfaces.
Facial ActionCoding (FACS) [18] is another promisingmethod used to catego-
rize facial movements and match themwith categories of emotional expressions.
fMRI scans are a way of understanding brain responses to stimuli, which have
been used to understand habituation to warnings in the past [5, 60]. Most
psychophysiological measurements work best when triangulated with other
methods for richer experiential insights.
Momentary UX should be
lowered so that the user has
an appropriate perception
of their current risk (see Fig-
ure 4).
Episodic UX After using a
technology
To evaluate experience after use, qualitative tools such as focus groups or
interviews can give rich insights into participants’ experience with a security-
enhancing friction; examples include [15, 53]. Standardized questionnaires
can help gain comparable insights based on theory. Good candidates for mea-
suring overall UX include the UEQ questionnaire [36], AttrakDiff [28], and
Psychological Needs Questionnaire [55]. The Geneva Emotions Wheel can help
evaluate overall emotions after use [54].
After an interaction, the
user should have an accept-
able UX overall; the momen-
tary drop in UX should not







When conducting an asynchronous study on security-enhancing friction, re-
searchers can also use the diarymethod [6] and ask participants to write down
certain elements or take pictures of moments where they felt a short spike of
negative UX in security- and privacy-related situations. The diary method has
been used by [29, 42] to study privacy/security topics.
Retrospective UX evaluation methods such as the UX Curve [33] can assist
users in retrospectively reporting how their experience changed over time. The
UX Curve is based on retrospective user reporting, where users themselves
indicate their experience over time. For security-enhancing friction, the UX
curve can help evaluate and visualize whether there was a momentary drop in
UX, which then recovered to an acceptable level.
After multiple uses, the user
should continue to have an
acceptable UX overall and









Risk-taking behavior can take many forms (e.g., continuously postponing up-
dates to a later point, sending sensitive data over insecure channels). If possible,
the occurrence of the risk-taking behavior should be measured through activity
logs or observations. If direct measurement is not feasible, behavioral intention
can be an easier-to-operationalise alternative.
The occurrence of risk-
taking behavior should be
lowered by the security-
enhancing friction as com-








Relevant knowledge questions can be used to understand whether a security-
enhancing friction improved user understanding. The level of knowledge users
should acquire through an interactionmust be defined a priori. Most interactions
will not aim at expert understanding of a technology. Refer to [19, 26] for an
example in UPS.
Note that creating under-
standing of security issues
is not the primary goal of
friction, but understanding
might be an intended effect
in certain contexts.
Table 3: Methods to measure effects of security-enhancing interventions in a nuanced way, enabling the design of security-
enhancing friction.
The Framework of Security-Enhancing Friction NSPW ’20, October 26–29, 2020, Online, USA




Table 1 shows that a number of security-enhancing interventions
already exist, and Section 7.1. gives some examples of existing
interventions that might be considered security-enhancing fric-
tion. Thus, one might question the novelty of our suggested ap-
proach. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to compare
security-enhancing interventions (e.g., nudges, warnings, fear ap-
peals), which have to date been studied extensively but mostly
separately. We compare and contrast them through the notion of
friction, thus providing a means to reflect on the effect these inter-
ventions may have on the user experience.
Our original contribution is the introduction of the notion of
security-enhancing friction enables the systematic, actionable and
controlled migration, and subsequent integration, of UX concepts
into usable privacy and security. Unlike previous concepts, security-
enhancing friction encompasses both the objective of stimulating
secure behavior and of maintaining an acceptable overall user expe-
rience. In this work, we strive to contribute to the further bridging
of UX and security, which will be of mutual benefit to both fields:
security can build on methods from UX and theories grounded in
psychology, while UX can be extended in include a security dimen-
sion, thus expanding the concept to the support of users’ privacy
and security.
10.2 Cumulative friction of security tasks and
security-enhancing friction
One might question whether security-enhancing friction simply
adds to the existing “friction” of having to complete certain security
tasks, such as creating a new password. Note, however, that security-
enhancing friction does not necessarily coincide with security tasks,
instead it can support existing security tasks. As in the example of a
password meter giving feedback to users, the form that requests us
to choose a password, is already there. Security-enhancing friction
attempts to improve the strength of the chosen password. The
user could still fail the purpose of the security task, by choosing a
guessable password. Actually, the “friction” of having to choose a
new password and the security-enhancing friction of the password
meters are not necessarily additive.
A security-enhancing friction can lighten the burden of having
to choose a new password; the color of the bar can help the user’s
experience with the original security task of creating a new pass-
word by letting them succeed faster and with better quality of result,
sparing them an otherwise long sequence of unsuccessful attempts,
or the unpleasant surprise to have their password guessed by an
intruder.
10.3 Habituation
Habituation might be a threat to the effectiveness of friction, as is
the case for most security-enhancing interventions (e.g., warnings
[2, 19, 23]). Longitudinal studies could reveal whether frictions
are vulnerable to this threat. The concept and methods proposed
in this article can help address habituation given that they allow
us to understand temporal dynamics linked to friction, and this
understanding can be used to periodically adapt the form of a
friction element for which habituation is known to occur.
UX methods even have the advantage of detecting the effects of
habituation on the experience level (e.g., decrease in perceived fric-
tion) before they have behavioral consequences. As such, they can
also contribute to exploring the thresholds for "sufficient" friction
to reliably expect an adequate behavioral response. Habituation
might not occur in other contexts, such as systems that are only
used for certain occasions (e.g., e-voting). Previous studies have re-
ported on promising approaches that seem resistant to habituation,
such as the use of polymorphic dialogues (dialogues that change
the required form of user input) [5, 60], opinionated design (visual
design techniques to promote the safe choice as the preferred op-
tion) [19] or certain attractors (interface modifications that attempt
to draw user’s attention to important information, for instance by
promoting interaction with salient information) [8].
10.4 Ethical challenges
There are two levels of ethical challenges that we find compelling.
First, on an experimental level, and in line with UPS experiments
in general, research on friction design will inevitably run into the
ethical challenge of exposing users to a certain level of risk, which
can sometimes lead to the use of deception in user studies. Cranor
and Buchler [13] point out that in the context of computer secu-
rity warnings, it can be necessary to lead participants to believe
that there is some actual risk involved. Such approaches make in-
tegrating ethical considerations at all stages of experiment design
obligatory.
From another point of view, friction might seem unethical at first
glance because it introduces a barrier to action, thus decreasing
users’ autonomy. However, given that security-enhancing friction is
designed to keep UX constant, such friction is inherently positive for
the user, since it aligns security and UX. We think that the concept
of security-enhancing friction can help advance this discussion by
providing a nuanced understanding of users’ experiencewhen using
security-enhancing friction. For instance, Renaud and Zimmermann
[51] outline ethical challenges linked to nudges, and suggest that
there should be a reasonable plan for monitoring the effect of the
intervention and for discontinuing it if unintended side effects are
detected. Security-enhancing friction encourages such nuanced
measurement of the effects of an intervention.
10.5 Similarities and differences to other
concepts
Our definition of security-enhancing friction bears similarity to
“soft paternalism” or nudges as defined by Acquisti et al., [1] in
support of privacy and security decision-making. The difference is
that security-enhancing friction encourages the use of UX methods
for a nuanced measurement of momentary negative UX, while
safeguarding an acceptable overall UX for users. The mere use of
behavioral measurements does not allow researchers and designers
to determine the success of security-enhancing friction.
One might also draw parallels to Kahneman’s [31] dual process-
ing theory, which differentiates between two modes of thought,
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system one (fast, instinctive and emotional) and system two (slower,
deliberative, logical), and was previously applied to the context of
security by Dennis and Minas [14]. These authors argue that se-
curity behaviors are mostly determined by system one cognition,
which may issue an alert if it detects a surprise or anomaly. In this
case, system two thinking can take over and potentially trigger a
more deliberate response. The authors give some examples of how
to trigger a switch from system one to system two thinking. For
instance, an organization could apply aversion training by regularly
sending out fake phishing emails and then lock individuals who
click on them out of their account for 15 minutes. Another example
is triggering a loud alarm whenever a person clicks on a phishing
email. One could also change situational normality by prohibiting
all organizational emails from containing a clickable link; any email
containing a link would thus become suspicious. This has some par-
allels to our approach. Dennis and Minas’ suggested interventions
introduce friction into an experience in order to trigger deliberate
system two thinking. However, extreme interventions can lead to
strong negative emotions among an organization’s employees (e.g.,
shame, frustration), potentially decreasing motivation and produc-
tivity. These shortcomings make it unlikely, in our eyes, that such
measures will be applied in organizations. In cases where users
are free to switch away from a service that exposes them to such
extreme interventions for security’s sake, they might well choose
to use another service provider. This makes it necessary to find a
more balanced approach to trigger system two thinking.
Thus, while our approach has a similar objective, interventions
that have a lasting deleterious effect on user experience cannot be
considered security-enhancing friction according to our definition.
Security-enhancing friction also requires the nuancedmeasurement
of people’s experiences during and after an interaction to ensure
that lasting negative impressions or exceedingly strong negative
emotions can reliably be avoided. The security-enhancing friction
approach we describe in this paper could therefore enhance the dual
processing framework by offering a controlled empirical approach
to influencing switching between the two modes.
One might also relate our approach to dark patterns, which are
part of a larger research agenda around persuasive design and
nudges [44]. Dark patterns are defined as interface designs that try
to guide end-users to desired behavior through malicious interac-
tion flows [24]. The difference is that security-enhancing friction,
per definition, is designed in the interest of the user (on both a UX
and a security level), while dark patterns are not designed with the
user’s best interest in mind. However, whenever design methods
are applied with the objective of changing behaviors, the question
arises as to for “whose good” nudges, and by extension security-
enhancing frictions, are designed [51].
11 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we argue that in the security context, it can be de-
sirable to use UX methods to design for moments of negative UX
in security-critical situations. We compare and contrast existing
security-enhancing interventions that are frequently studied sepa-
rately (e.g., nudges, warnings, fear appeals) through the common
lens of friction. Building on these insights, we introduce the novel
framework of security-enhancing friction, which provides an action-
able way to systematically integrate the concept of user experience
into empirical UPS studies and ensure that both the objective of
secure behavior and of an acceptable overall experience can be met.
Through this work, we strive further bridge the disciplines of user
experience and privacy/security, and we hope that this article is the
first of many investigating how to intentionally create temporary
negative experiences through nuanced friction design when it is in
the user’s interest.
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